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Abstract 
Does fiscal discipline restrain government from increasing its budget size? To 
answer this question, this paper investigates whether Wagner’s law is satisfied 
for two types of states: U.S. states, in which fiscal sovereignty is established, 
and German states, in which fiscal transfer dependence is high and budget 
constraints are softened. In U.S. states, we demonstrate that Wagner’s law is 
validated, while some of the balanced budget requirements weaken the validity 
of the law. In German states, we find an “inverse” law, especially after the 
bailouts of Bremen and Saarland. The “inverse” law is a new channel of 
growth in government size, and means that soft budget constraints cause 
significant negative correlation between government size and output. These 
results are robust regardless of whether intergovernmental fiscal transfers are 
taken into account, while they quantitatively change the validity of the law. 
Our findings imply that the characteristics of fiscal discipline are prime 
determinants of the channel and degree of growth in government size. 
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1. Introduction 
A number of industrialized economies have experienced substantial public sector 
growth over the last few centuries. The most prominent theory purporting to explain this 
long-run growth was proposed by the German political economist Adolph Wagner more 
than a century ago. His view is now commonly known as Wagner’s law of increasing 
state activity. Many researchers have been interested in the validity of the law, which is a 
crucial factor for fiscal rigidity and the government debt problem. If the law is strongly 
supported, then government expenditure or budget size increases at a more rapid rate than 
economic growth; as a result, government is likely to be forced to abandon a flexible 
fiscal policy or to borrow excessively. With this background, over the past century, 
Wagner’s law has been intensively tested for many countries and periods. However, 
earlier empirical works find mixed results for the validity of the law, and there is no 
general consensus among researchers on the law.1  
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze how fiscal discipline affects the validity 
of Wagner’s law, and to shed new light on the vast empirical literature. To accomplish 
this, we focus on two federal states: the United States and Germany. This is because fiscal 
discipline at the state level is quite different between these two countries, as stated in 
                                                   
1 The Wagner’s law literature is too voluminous to survey here. See, for example, Peacock and Scott 
(2000) and Durevall and Henrekson (2011) for extensive surveys of the literature. 
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Bordo et al. (2013) and Potrafke and Reischmann (2015). In U.S. states, in addition to a 
high degree of expenditure decentralization, tax bases and rates are determined with 
discretionary powers, and fiscal sovereignty is established. On the other hand, in German 
states, although the expenditure is restrained by federal law and almost all tax bases and 
rates are determined by federal law, the state governments have full autonomy in 
borrowing. 2  More importantly, the U.S. and German federal governments officially 
follow the no-bailout rule, but in Germany the credibility of the commitment is lacking 
and the softening of state budget constraints is a serious problem (see, e.g., Rodden 
2003).3 
The present study follows recent contributions by Narayan, Nielsen, and Smyth 
(2008), Narayan, Prasad, and Singh (2008), and Narayan, Rath, and Narayan (2012), who 
conduct state-level analyses of Wagner’s law. As emphasized in those studies, there are 
several reasons why one should examine Wagner’s law at the state level.4 Among others, 
                                                   
2  Following the so-called golden rule, German states are officially allowed to borrow only for 
investment purposes, but in reality they can simply circumvent the rule. See Qian and Roland (1998) 
for the relationship between the decentralization of government and the soft budget constraint.  
3 While the German federal government has prudent fiscal policies, state-level fiscal discipline is 
eroded. The “equivalence of living conditions” clause in the Basic Law compels the federal 
government to bail out a state that faces a debt crisis. Recent bailout episodes can be seen in the cases 
of Bremen and Saarland. See Rodden (2003) for more details of soft budget problems in German states.  
4 While almost all researchers investigate the law using national-level data, a recent direction in 
Wagner’s law literature focuses on validity at the subnational or state level. Abizadeh and Yousefi 
(1988) produced the first paper to employ state-level data to test the law. Abizadeh and Yousefi use 
time-series data for 10 U.S. states for the period 1950 to 1984, and their results support the law. More 
recently, applying a panel unit root, panel cointegration, and Granger causality analysis, Narayan, 
Nielsen, and Smyth (2008) examine the law on the basis of data from Chinese provinces and find 
mixed results. Narayan, Prasad, and Singh (2008) conduct time-series analysis for the Fiji islands and 
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important points in their discussion are summarized as follows.  
First, given that Wagner did not take account of the influences of wars, a tacit 
assumption about the law is that the economy is under peacetime conditions. This is 
related to another leading theory, the so-called displacement effect (also known as the 
Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis), which can be relevant to the long-run behavior of 
government size under crises such as wars. 5 Although government expenditures are 
subject to political and military conflicts, their effects are lower at the state level than at 
the national level. From this perspective, the use of state-level data fits with Wagner’s 
supposition. 
Second, when conducting cross-sectional or panel data analysis, cultural and 
institutional differences across regions can be troublesome. Compared with national- or 
federal-level data, the use of state-level data enables us to lessen the effects of such 
differences across regions. Third, a central (federal) government’s expenditures are more 
likely to be influenced by international economic conditions than are a local government’s 
                                                   
vindicate the law. Like Narayan, Nielsen, and Smyth (2008), utilizing panel data techniques, Narayan, 
Rath, and Narayan (2012) investigate the law for the 15 Indian states and provide strong support of 
the law. 
5 The displacement effect is initially found by Peacock and Wiseman (1961), who show that the 
sudden increase in government expenditure during World War I and World War II does not return to 
the pre-war levels in the United Kingdom. In other words, Peacock and Wiseman find stepwise 
increases in UK government size through World Wars I and II. Such a long-run growth in government 
size makes an analysis of Wagner’s law difficult. Using historical data from Italy, Cavicchioli and 
Pistoresi (2016) find that military spending during wars results in nonlinearities between variables. 
See also Funashima (2016), who distinguishes between Wagner’s law and the displacement effect. 
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expenditures. 
With the exception of Abizadeh and Yousefi (1988), who study 10 U.S. states, our 
study differs from all others in that state-level data from the United States and Germany 
are utilized to test the law. Unlike Abizadeh and Yousefi (1988), the present empirical 
method is based on cointegration analysis and incorporates extended panel data 
techniques, as in many recent predecessors. Excluding Narayan, Nielsen, and Smyth 
(2008) and Narayan, Rath, and Narayan (2012), this study is the first to apply the panel 
cointegration approach to test the law, while almost all previous studies use time-series 
data.  
 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2] 
 
Further, in contrast to previous studies, we attempt to undertake more elaborate 
analysis by taking into account the effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfer payments 
on the validity of the law. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, fiscal transfer is negatively 
correlated with economic development, indicating that fiscal transfer plays a role in 
horizontal equity across states in the U.S. and German federal system. Fiscal transfer is 
especially substantial in Germany, and the transfer dependence of the states is high. In 
this connection, Figures 3 and 4 plot the relationship between fiscal transfer and state 
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government size in the U.S. and German states. The figures demonstrate that, in both 
countries, state government size is positively correlated with fiscal transfer, meaning that 
the latter may be a crucial factor for determining the former. In other words, it is highly 
probable that if fiscal transfers are ignored in empirical analyses of state-level Wagner’s 
law, some omitted variable bias problems will occur and, consequently, misleading 
conclusions will be obtained.  
 
[Insert Figures 3 and 4] 
 
   Our results uncover that, in both countries, fiscal transfers have non-negligible effects 
on state government size, and the introduction of fiscal transfers quantitatively changes 
the validity of the law. This suggests that if fiscal transfers are omitted, then the outcomes 
are highly likely to be biased. However, the qualitative results are the same regardless of 
whether fiscal transfers are considered. That is, our results reveal that the law is validated 
in the U.S. states, but, on the other hand, an “inverse” law is supported in German states. 
Moreover, we find that the U.S. validity of the law is weakened by some of the balanced 
budget requirements. The German “inverse” law, a negative correlation between 
government size and output, is likely to be caused by the soft budget constraints, 
especially after the bailouts of Bremen and Saarland in 1992. These opposite outcomes 
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between the U.S. and German states imply that the characteristics of fiscal discipline are 
relevant to the validity of the law, and that the public sector can grow through different 
channels. This implication offers new insights into the empirical literature wherein 
heterogeneous consequences of the law are presented. 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the present empirical 
framework and describes the data. Section 3 presents our empirical results, and Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Empirical framework and data  
2.1. Panel cointegration analysis of Wagner’s law for U.S. and German states  
As described in Ram (1987), Peacock and Scott (2000), and Durevall and Henrekson 
(2011), multiple variables have been hitherto supposed to test Wagner’s law. Among 
others, the specification proposed by Musgrave (1969) is commonly used in the empirical 
papers. In previous analyses, share of government expenditure in GDP is used as a proxy 
for government size, and real income per capita is used as a proxy for economic 
development (see, e.g., Mann 1980; Durevall and Henrekson 2011). 
Following the bulk of the recent empirical literature regarding Wagner’s law, our 
analysis builds on cointegration analysis to investigate the long-run relationship between 
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government size and economic development (e.g., Islam 2001; Chang 2002; Iyare and 
Lorde 2004; Durevall and Henrekson 2011; Kuckuck 2014). Since we use state-level 
panel data, our basic model can be written as:  
ln𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 ln 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is share of state government expenditure in GDP (state government size), 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 
is real GDP per capita, and subscripts 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 are the cross-section of states and time, 
respectively. Note that GDP is the total value of goods and services produced within a 
state. If Wagner’s law holds, then the coefficient 𝛼𝛼1 should be significantly larger than 
zero.  
As mentioned in our introduction, the present study considers the potential effects of 
fiscal transfer payments on the validity of state-level Wagner’s law (i.e., the cointegrating 
relationship between 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 and 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦).6 To this end, by introducing the third variable, we 
also consider the modified specification: 
ln𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 ln 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 denotes share of state fiscal transfers in GDP.7 The coefficient 𝛼𝛼2 should 
be significantly positive if fiscal transfers have positive effects on state government size.  
                                                   
6 In the Wagner’s law literature, all studies conduct cointegration analysis in a bivariate system. One 
notable exception is Chow et al. (2002), who emphasize the importance of controlling the effects of a 
third variable on the cointegrating relationship between government size and economic development. 
7 As described later, net state fiscal transfers can be negative in Germany, and ln 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 is undefined. 
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   As documented in Potrafke and Reischmann (2015), although intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers are implemented to fund the budgets of state and local governments in the 
federal systems of both the United States and Germany, a key difference in fiscal transfer 
systems exists between the two countries. In the United States, the transfer payments are 
only vertical, and the federal government transfers to the states. However, in Germany, 
horizontal transfers between the states are performed in addition to vertical transfers. 
Hence, the U.S. payments are basically positive, whereas the German payments can be 
negative in rich states.8 
 
2.2. Datasets 
   All datasets are taken from Potrafke and Reischmann (2015). For the U.S. states, our 
annual data cover the period from 1977 to 2010 for 47 states; the data exclude Alaska, 
Wyoming, and Hawaii. For the German states, our annual data cover the period from 1975 
to 2010 for the 10 West German states, excluding Berlin.9 
   For 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 and 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦, we use the state-level data that include municipalities. Moreover, 
in order to focus on the state government behavior, we also use data that exclude 
                                                   
8 Baretti et al. (2002) focus on the German federal fiscal system and demonstrate that it is likely that 
the equalizing transfers reduce the tax revenue of the states.  
9 Following Potrafke and Reischmann (2015), these three U.S. states are excluded because they are 
outliers. Likewise, Berlin is not included in our sample. Further, the East German states cannot be 
examined because of the lack of fiscal transfer data before 1995.  
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municipalities. Figure 5 shows the scatter diagram of 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 for the U.S. states, 
including municipalities. A similar scatter diagram for West German states is plotted in 
Figure 6. Although the individual state effects and other various factors are not controlled 
in these figures, one can see no evident correlation between state government size and 
real output per capita in the U.S. states, while negative correlation can be seen in the case 
of West German states. 
 
[Insert Figures 5 and 6] 
 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Panel unit root tests 
Prior to panel cointegration analyses, the first task is to check whether our variables 
contain a panel unit root. For the U.S. states, our datasets include five variables: 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 
(including municipalities), 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  (excluding municipalities), 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦  (including 
municipalities), and 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦  (excluding municipalities). For West German states, they 
include four variables: 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 , 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  (including municipalities), 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔  (excluding 
municipalities), and 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦. For these variables in levels and in first differences, we first 
perform two panel unit root tests: the tests from Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003). 
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In the former test, homogeneity in the autoregressive coefficient across cross-sections is 
assumed; the latter test allows for heterogeneity.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Table 1 reports the results. From the Im et al. (2003) test results, the null hypothesis 
of the unit roots for all variables cannot be rejected, suggesting that each variable is panel 
nonstationary and has at least one panel unit root. On the other hand, one can confirm 
strong rejections for all the variables in both tests when series are taken in first differences. 
We therefore determine that all of our underlying variables appear to be integrated of 
order 1 (𝐼𝐼(1)).  
 
3.2. Panel cointegration tests 
   In the next step, the panel cointegration tests proposed by Pedroni (1999) are 
conducted to examine whether there is a panel cointegrating relation in the bivariate and 
trivariate systems: (ln𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔, ln𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦) and (ln𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔, ln 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦). We run four within-group 
tests and three between-group tests. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
The outcomes are reported in Table 2. From Panel (A) of Table 2, in which the results 
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of the bivariate case are shown, one can find that the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
is rejected in both the United States and Germany, on the whole. In particular, almost all 
results of the ADF-statistic test reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. 
This suggests that there is a panel cointegrating relationship in our bivariate system. The 
results of the trivariate system are reported in Panel (B) of Table 2. As with the two-
variable case, the results suggest the presence of a panel cointegrating relationship in our 
three-variable system. 
 
3.3. Panel cointegrating vector estimations 
Now we present estimation results of the cointegrating vector. In order to estimate the 
vector, we utilize two methods: the fully modified ordinary least squares (hereafter 
FMOLS) and dynamic ordinary least squares (hereafter DOLS) methods. In what follows, 
while we report the results when lag and lead lengths of the DOLS equation are assumed 
to be unity, the results when their lengths are two are almost the same. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 3. Panel (A) of Table 3 shows the results 
of the bivariate system, which indicate that the coefficients of ln 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦  estimated by 
FMOLS and DOLS are positive and significant at the 1% significance level in the U.S. 
case. In contrast, those of the German case are negative and significant at the 1% 
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significance level, while their absolute values are vastly larger than in the U.S. case. These 
findings provide support for Wagner’s law in the U.S. states, but no support in the German 
states.10  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Panel (B) of Table 3 shows the results of the trivariate system. In both countries, all 
of the estimated coefficients of 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 are positive, and almost of them are statistically 
significant.11 This implies that fiscal transfers have positive effects on state government 
size. However, the qualitative validity of Wagner’s law is robust in the sense that the signs 
of the coefficients of ln 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 do not depend on whether 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 is taken into account. 
Hence, we can conclude that Wagner’s law is strongly validated in the U.S. states, 
whereas it does not hold in the German states. 
From the standpoint of fiscal discipline, in the U.S. states, balanced budget rules at 
the state level can be relevant to the law. With the exception of Vermont, U.S. state 
governments are obliged to follow various balanced budget requirements. It is possible 
that some balanced budget rules urge policymakers to coordinate expenditures with the 
                                                   
10 See Koester and Priesmeier (2013) for the national-level relationship between Wagner’s law and 
the sustainability of public finances in Germany. 
11 In Germany, the transfer dependence of municipalities is higher than that of states. For this reason, 
the positive effects of fiscal transfers might be statistically significant only when municipalities are 
included.   
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degree of economic growth in the long run, although the rules are not stringent in the 
short run, as stated in Poterba (1996) and Potrafke and Reischmann (2015).  
In order to capture the effects of fiscal stringency stemming from balanced budget 
rules, we identify regional differences in balanced budget requirements across the U.S. 
states. To do this, as in Mahdavi and Westerlund (2011, Table 1), we use the following 
five measures of the degree of fiscal stringency.12  
The first measure is the ACIR fiscal stringency index (ACIR-FSI), which is based on 
the assessment of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. ACIR-FSI 
represents the extent to which “a state has a constitutional or statutory no-deficit-
carryover provision,” and its values are between 0 and 10. The remaining four measures 
are BBR2, BBR5, BBR7, and BBR9. All of them take 1 when a certain balanced budget 
requirement is in place, and 0 otherwise. A state where BBR2 is equal to 1 is forced to 
“balance the budget based on own-source revenues alone.” In a state where BBR5 is equal 
to 1, “a limit is in place on the amount of debt.” In a state where BBR7 is equal to 1, there 
exists “a control on supplementary appropriations” and “the opportunity to rebudget” is 
limited. In a state where BBR9 is equal to 1, “no deficit may be carried over to the next 
fiscal year or biennium.”  
                                                   
12 For details of the measures, see Mahdavi and Westerlund (2011). 
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Utilizing these five measures of balanced budget rules to split our observations, Table 
4 explores the effects of balanced budget requirements on the validity of Wagner’s law in 
U.S. states. Regarding ACIR-FSI, we follow Mahdavi and Westerlund (2011) and divide 
the sample into two groups; in one group ACIR-FSI is not lower than 8, and in the other 
group it is not lower than 6.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Focusing first on the results of ln 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 in the case of ACIR-FSI, regardless of whether 
municipalities are included, there are no systematic differences in outcomes. Further, it is 
suggested that BBR5 does not create a large difference in the coefficients of ln 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦. On 
the other hand, one can find that the balanced budget requirements of BBR2 and BBR7 
yield smaller estimated values of 𝛼𝛼1. Only in the case where municipalities are excluded 
does BBR9 substantially lower the coefficients of ln𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦. These outcomes imply that 
some of the balanced budget requirements are effective for restraining the growth of 
government budget and size.  
In the German states, we find a significantly negative correlation between ln𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 
and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔, suggesting an “inverse” Wagner’s law. In terms of the characteristics of fiscal 
discipline, one possible explanation for the “inverse” law would stem from the soft budget 
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problems of the German states. If the credibility and commitment of the German federal 
government’s no-bailout rule are lacking, then there would be an incentive for the state 
government to borrow excessively. Given that the softening of state budget constraints 
has a greater influence on poor or low-growth states than on rich or high-growth states, 
slack economic development in the long run would heighten government size.  
To test this hypothesis formally, we estimate the cointegrating vector by dividing the 
German sample into two subsample periods: 1975–1992 and 1993–2010. The reason for 
adopting these subsamples is related to the famous bailouts of Bremen and Saarland in 
1992 (see, e.g., Rodden 2003). It is quite probable that their bailouts have significantly 
softened German state budget constraints. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the estimation. Comparing the subsample outcomes, one 
can detect remarkable changes of the estimated coefficients of ln𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 between the two 
subsamples. Regardless of whether municipalities are included, the difference is really 
remarkable in both the bivariate and trivariate systems. 13  Comparing the former 
                                                   
13 When excluding municipalities, the coefficient of 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 for 1993–2010 is significantly negative. 
This result arguably comes from the fiscal consolidation of the Maastricht Treaty as well as the bailout 
of Bremen and Saarland. In other words, for the purpose of fiscal consolidation, the state governments 
are forced to cut expenditures even when transfers increase. 
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subsample of 1975–1992 to the full sample results, the estimated values of 𝛼𝛼1 are shifted 
toward zero, meaning that real output per capita has a limited impact on government size. 
On the other hand, with the latter subsample of 1993–2010, substantially lower estimated 
values of 𝛼𝛼1 are exhibited. This result supports the view that the “inverse” Wagner’s law 
is more validated after the bailouts of Bremen and Saarland in 1992. Thus, Table 5 
provides strong confirmation of the hypothesis that the German “inverse” law appears to 
be primarily explained by the softening of state budget constraints. 
 
4. Conclusion 
   In this paper, we examined Wagner’s law for U.S. and German states, which have 
different characteristics of fiscal discipline. This study sheds new light on the voluminous 
previous empirical works on Wagner’s law in the following respects. First, to the best of 
our knowledge, the present study is first attempt to investigate the law for U.S. and 
German states, with the exception of Abizadeh and Yousefi (1988), who study 10 U.S. 
states. Second, our study differs from all predecessors that investigate the law at the state 
level in that fiscal transfers are taken into account. Third, although almost all previous 
studies use time-series data, this is the first to use the panel cointegration approach to test 
the law, except for Narayan, Nielsen, and Smyth (2008) and Narayan, Rath, and Narayan 
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(2012). 
Our main findings are summarized as follows. First, we show that significant effects 
of fiscal transfers on state government size are shown in most samples of the two countries. 
While state-level data are useful to test the law, as mentioned earlier, this outcome 
provides an important suggestion that fiscal transfers should be taken into account when 
exploring Wagner’s law at the state or subnational level. Second, we demonstrate that 
characteristics of fiscal discipline are relevant to the validity of the law and that the 
qualitative results are the same regardless of whether fiscal transfers are considered. In 
other words, we provide strong evidence to support the law in U.S. states and the “inverse” 
law in German states. For the U.S. results, it is suggested that some of the balanced budget 
requirements weaken the validity of the law.  
Third, and most important, we find the German “inverse” law, especially after the 
bailouts of Bremen and Saarland. This finding points to a new channel of growth in 
government size: soft budget constraints can cause significant negative correlation 
between government size and economic development. 
Although the relationship between Wagner’s law and fiscal discipline appears to be 
overlooked in previous empirical works, our results suggest that it is essential to take into 
account characteristics of fiscal discipline when evaluating the law. This suggestion offers 
20 
 
new insights into the empirical literature wherein mixed results on the validity of the law 
are presented. 
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Table 1: The results of panel unit root tests 
 
Notes: *, **, and *** represent rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic
ln ypc 5.846 5.297 -2.305 ** 0.145
Δ ln ypc -23.039 *** -21.823 *** -14.261 *** -12.584 ***
   Including municipalities
ln gs -0.034 1.804 -0.650 1.904
Δ ln gs -27.943 *** -28.568 *** -13.875 *** -13.749 ***
tray 10.596 8.335 -0.109 -0.440
Δ tray -14.363 *** -18.433 *** -20.306 *** -18.400 ***
   Excluding municipalities
ln gs -0.378 2.602 -0.527 1.719
Δ ln gs -32.728 *** -32.444 *** -13.708 *** -15.987 ***
tray 12.605 11.848 -0.109 -0.440
Δ tray -16.338 *** -21.137 *** -20.306 *** -18.400 ***
Levin et al. (2002) Im et al. (2003) Levin et al. (2002) Im et al. (2003)
GermanyThe United States
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Table 2: The results of Pedroni cointegration tests 
 
Notes: *, **, and *** represent rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v-Stat rho-Stat PP-Stat ADF-Stat rho-Stat PP-Stat ADF-Stat
(A)Two variables
   The United States
      Including municipalities  17.729*** -1.927** -4.285*** -5.838***  0.899 -3.548*** -5.475***
      Excluding municipalities  11.022*** -1.928** -4.835*** -5.951***  0.381 -5.681*** -6.067***
   Germany
      Including municipalities -0.471  0.177 -0.455 -1.561*  1.256  0.333 -1.453*
      Excluding municipalities -0.047 -0.630 -2.137*** -2.690***  0.143 -2.409*** -4.186***
(B)Three variables
   The United States
      Including municipalities  9.734***  1.081 -1.351** -2.658***  3.129 -1.595* -4.202***
      Excluding municipalities  5.911*** -0.592 -3.593*** -4.996***  1.652 -4.287*** -6.248***
   Germany
      Including municipalities -0.030 -0.158 -1.369 -3.902***  0.985 -0.837 -3.496***
      Excluding municipalities  1.095 -1.675** -3.822*** -4.721*** -0.102 -3.147*** -4.477***
Panel (Within-dimension)  Group (Between-dimension)
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Table 3: The results of FMOLS and DOLS 
 
Notes: The values in parentheses are the standard error. *, **, and *** represent rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
ln ypc tray ln ypc tray
(A)Two variables
   The United States
      Including municipalities 0.362*** 0.339***
(0.014) (0.014)
      Excluding municipalities 0.460*** 0.437***
(0.015) (0.016)
   Germany
      Including municipalities -0.660*** -0.729***
(0.029) (0.036)
      Excluding municipalities -0.529*** -0.586***
(0.025) (0.029)
(B)Three variables
   The United States
      Including municipalities 0.222*** 5.991*** 0.214*** 4.131***
(0.017) (0.459) (0.025) (0.697)
      Excluding municipalities 0.190*** 10.455*** 0.191*** 9.150***
(0.017) (0.483) (0.028) (0.869)
   Germany
      Including municipalities -0.625*** 7.538*** -0.683*** 9.468***
(0.030) (1.754) (0.037) (2.150)
      Excluding municipalities -0.573*** 1.803 -0.652*** 1.924
(0.023) (1.284) (0.028) (1.440)
FMOLS DOLS
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Table 4: Effects of balanced budget requirements in the United States 
 
Notes: The values in parentheses are the standard error. *, **, and *** represent rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
ln ypc tray ln ypc tray
Including municipalities
   ACIR-FSI≥8 0.228*** 5.274*** 0.212*** 3.285***
(0.020) (0.574) (0.029) (0.880)
   ACIR-FSI≤6 0.207*** 7.866*** 0.218*** 6.342***
(0.031) (0.711) (0.052) (1.033)
   BBR 2=1 0.132*** 4.750*** 0.144** 1.312
(0.047) (1.294) (0.072) (2.043)
   BBR 2=0 0.247*** 6.326*** 0.233*** 4.893***
(0.018) (0.467) (0.025) (0.693)
   BBR 5=1 0.247*** 5.488*** 0.236*** 3.741***
(0.022) (0.712) (0.028) (0.987)
   BBR 5=0 0.203*** 6.397*** 0.196*** 4.446***
(0.025) (0.599) (0.040) (0.977)
   BBR 7=1 0.147*** 7.162*** 0.116** 5.948***
(0.031) (0.774) (0.046) (1.230)
   BBR 7=0 0.265*** 5.328*** 0.269*** 3.101***
(0.020) (0.571) (0.030) (0.842)
   BBR 9=1 0.187*** 6.869*** 0.218*** 4.571**
(0.055) (1.303) (0.082) (1.959)
   BBR 9=0 0.230*** 5.811*** 0.213*** 4.040***
(0.017) (0.485) (0.025) (0.738)
Excluding municipalities
   ACIR-FSI≥8 0.196*** 9.385*** 0.194*** 7.961***
(0.022) (0.598) (0.035) (1.104)
   ACIR-FSI≤6 0.173*** 13.256*** 0.184*** 12.261***
(0.026) (0.773) (0.046) (1.234)
   BBR 2=1 0.063 10.935*** 0.101 7.387***
(0.047) (1.107) (0.084) (2.028)
   BBR 2=0 0.224*** 10.325*** 0.216*** 9.627***
(0.018) (0.535) (0.027) (0.958)
   BBR 5=1 0.227*** 8.750*** 0.227*** 6.930***
(0.021) (0.664) (0.028) (1.058)
   BBR 5=0 0.160*** 11.833*** 0.162*** 10.944***
(0.026) (0.689) (0.045) (1.317)
   BBR 7=1 0.109*** 11.527*** 0.096* 11.033***
(0.035) (0.918) (0.058) (1.752)
   BBR 7=0 0.235*** 9.848*** 0.245*** 8.084***
(0.019) (0.549) (0.029) (0.931)
   BBR 9=1 0.093* 12.196*** 0.147 10.270***
(0.055) (1.017) (0.098) (1.854)
   BBR 9=0 0.210*** 10.098*** 0.200*** 8.921***
(0.018) (0.543) (0.027) (0.975)
FMOLS DOLS
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Table 5: Effects of bailouts of Bremen and Saarland in Germany 
 
Notes: The values in parentheses are the standard error. *, **, and *** represent rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
ln ypc tray ln ypc tray
(A)Two variables
   Including municipalities
      1975-1992 -0.326*** -0.365***
(0.017) (0.020)
      1993-2010 -1.223*** -1.373***
(0.070) (0.088)
   Excluding municipalities
      1975-1992 -0.328*** -0.361***
(0.022) (0.024)
      1993-2010 -0.912*** -1.010***
(0.051) (0.060)
(B)Three variables
   Including municipalities
      1975-1992 -0.323*** 2.434 -0.349*** -1.918
(0.023) (2.191) (0.061) (4.971)
      1993-2010 -1.290*** -2.507 -1.241*** 0.142
(0.071) (1.776) (0.124) (2.894)
   Excluding municipalities
      1975-1992 -0.346*** 9.096*** -0.343*** 9.465
(0.027) (2.627) (0.072) (6.330)
      1993-2010 -0.954*** -5.175*** -0.885*** -4.571**
(0.054) (1.284) (0.103) (2.184)
FMOLS DOLS
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Fig. 1 Economic development and fiscal transfers in the U.S. states 
Notes: 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 is real GDP per capita and 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 is share of state fiscal transfers in GDP. Data are taken 
from Potrafke and Reischmann (2015). 
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Fig. 2 Economic development and fiscal transfers in the German states 
Notes: 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 is real GDP per capita and 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 is share of state fiscal transfers in GDP. Data are taken 
from Potrafke and Reischmann (2015). 
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Fig. 3 Fiscal transfers and government size in the U.S. states 
 
Notes: 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 is share of state fiscal transfers in GDP and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is share of state government expenditure 
in GDP (state government size). Data are taken from Potrafke and Reischmann (2015). 
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Fig. 4 Fiscal transfers and government size in the German states 
 
Notes: 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 is share of state fiscal transfers in GDP and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is share of state government expenditure 
in GDP (state government size). Data are taken from Potrafke and Reischmann (2015). 
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Fig. 5 Economic development and government size in the U.S. states 
 
Notes: 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 is real GDP per capita and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is share of state government expenditure in GDP (state 
government size). Data are taken from Potrafke and Reischmann (2015). 
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 Fig. 6 Economic development and government size in the German states 
 
Notes: 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 is real GDP per capita and 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 is share of state government expenditure in GDP (state 
government size). Data are taken from Potrafke and Reischmann (2015). 
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